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Abstract
In this paper, we incorporate o¤shoring of labor-intensive goods in a model with
multi-product rms, and explore its implications in partial and general oligopolistic
equilibrium. We identify important aspects of this phenomenon and argue that im-
provements in o¤shoring opportunities can a¤ect the geographic organization of a rm
and its product range. Multi-product rms internalize supply linkages (exible man-
ufacturing) and demand linkages (cannibalization e¤ect). In partial equilibrium, we
nd that more products are produced o¤shore on a larger scale and rms expand their
product range with better prospects for o¤shoring. We identify the cannibalization
e¤ect as an important transmission mechanism within multi-product rms and show
that the latter e¤ect hits domestic labor demand in addition to the well-known relo-
cation e¤ect. Interestingly in general equilibrium these e¤ects lead to adjustments in
domestic factor prices and may cause a partial re-relocation of product lines.
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1 Introduction
In the last decades, progress in communication and information technologies has changed
the international organization of production. Markets are dominated by large multinational
rms that control and manage production lines on a global scale. Global production networks
enable rms to benet from the generally lower labor costs in emerging countries. Against
this background, industrialized countries fear a decline of jobs and pressure on wages. Recent
academic research has identied two main channels by which o¤shoring a¤ects domestic labor
demand. Firstly, there is a relocation e¤ect from the displacement of tasks that formerly
were carried out domestically. Secondly, there are e¢ ciency gains from vertical specialization
that benet domestic workers and increase domestic labor demand.1
In this paper, we study the consequences of a di¤erent kind of o¤shoring: O¤shoring of
production lines within multi-product rms (MPFs). Analyzing rms that o¤er a bundle of
horizontally linked products leads to important new insights into the e¤ects of o¤shoring.
Our results are crucially di¤erent from the well-known e¤ects of relocating just parts of a
production process of a single product. In particular, we argue that the e¢ ciency e¤ect of
o¤shoring can only occur if the production of a single good is linked sequentially in two or
more countries. Moreover, at least part of the production stages have to remain in the home
country so that domestic employment can benet from the higher productivity. If, however,
the total production line is relocated, the latter e¤ect vanishes. A rm which produces a
range of products can decide for each product where it is produced most e¢ ciently. We will
show that it is the labor intensity of each product which determines its optimal production
location.
The relocation of a complete production process not only prevents the e¢ ciency e¤ect
of o¤shoring but causes a cannibalization e¤ect of o¤shoring that has not been discussed
in the literature. If the products within the product range of an MPF are horizontally
di¤erentiated, the introduction of a new product will create a negative demand externality
on all other products of this rm. This is typically referred to as the cannibalization e¤ect
and plays a big role in our analysis. Giving a rm the opportunity to o¤shore production will
lead to a relocation of labor-intensive products and to an extension of the product range with
additional products. We show that both operations will cannibalize output of domestically
produced goods and reduce demand for labor in the home country.
A growing literature on MPFs stresses horizontal relationships between products within
the boundaries of a single rm and analyzes the e¤ects of globalization on the product range
1The e¢ ciency or productivity e¤ect of o¤shoring is stressed in recent contributions to the o¤shoring
literature, such as Eckel (2003), Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008), Rodriguez-Clare (2010), and Egger
et al. (2013).
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of a rm. Bernard et al. (2010) emphasize this as a new margin of rm adjustment, which
Eckel and Neary (2010) refer to as intra-rm extensive margin. Within a multi-product
framework, we investigate how improvements in the opportunities for o¤shoring a¤ect the
geographic organization and the product range of an MPF. For this purpose, we set up
a general oligopolistic equilibrium (GOLE) model with MPFs and enrich this framework
by introducing the rms opportunity to o¤shore the production of multiple varieties to a
low-wage emerging country. Varieties within a rms product line are linked on the cost
side through a exible manufacturing technology, which captures the idea that - besides a
core competence - an MPF can expand its portfolio with varieties that are less e¢ cient in
production. When producing abroad, a rm can use the same production technology as in
the home country but additionally it has to bear o¤shoring costs.
We derive our results in partial and in general equilibrium. As a main result in partial
equilibrium, we nd that more products are produced abroad when prospects for o¤shoring
improve. Furthermore, savings from lower o¤shoring costs lead to an extension of the prod-
uct portfolio as the opportunity to produce labor-intensive products abroad enlarges the
prot maximizing product range of an MPF. In a model where rms internalize demand
linkages, rising outputs of foreign-produced varieties and additional varieties in the portfolio
are crowding out domestic production, that does not benet from lower o¤shoring costs.
We stress this cannibalization e¤ect as an important transmission channel that is specic to
MPFs. In our model, in addition to the well-established relocation e¤ect, cannibalization
hits domestic production. For this reason, the analysis in partial equilibrium clearly indicates
that domestic labor demand will decrease in the presence of more o¤shoring.
In general equilibrium, our analysis highlights adjustments through factor markets as
an important transmission channel of external shocks on both the cuto¤ variety and the
product range.2 With endogenous domestic wages the results are not as clear cut anymore.
It is no longer apparent that more products will be produced o¤shore with falling o¤shoring
costs. We show that the more domestic production benets from falling domestic wages the
more likely is the partial result reversed in general equilibrium. Therefore, our model is able
to predict patterns in which rms "re-relocate" entire product lines following a decline in
o¤shoring costs and a delayed fall in wages.
Our paper builds on and extends two strands of the existing literature in international
trade on both MPFs and o¤shoring. Particularly with regard to the connection of both
strands, Baldwin and Ottaviano (2001) come up with a multi-product setting where oligopolis-
tic rms may produce some varieties in one country and other varieties in another. However,
2The cuto¤ variety is dened as the product where the rm is indi¤erent concerning the optimal produc-
tion location. It is characterized by equal production costs in the home country and the o¤shore destination.
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they explain intra-rm trade patterns akin to reciprocal dumping à la Brander and Krug-
man (1983) and not via factor price di¤erences across countries. Hence, their approach is not
associated with o¤shoringper se. In a recent paper, Yeaple (2012) extends a framework
by Bernard et al. (2011) with a proximity-concentration tradeo¤. In his setting, rms pro-
duce multiple products for multiple countries and choose whether to export from the home
country or to manufacture locally. Unlike to our paper, his focus is not on wage di¤erentials
between countries but on rm heterogeneity with respect to managerial expertise. Managers
deliver expertise to foreign a¢ liates, which means that rms with a higher manager e¢ ciency
tend to build foreign a¢ liates rather than to export to foreign countries. In an empirical
analysis, McCalman and Spearot (2013) examine the role of vertical product di¤erentiation
in the decision where to produce a specic variety. Using a dataset of light truck sales in
the US, Canada and Mexico, they study the location decision of nal assembly. The pat-
terns of o¤shoring that they nd can be explained by the labor intensity in the automobile
production. Furthermore, it is consistent with one of our theoretical predictions that foreign
output is produced at a lower scale.
We also contribute to the large literature on international production. Our way to de-
termine the cuto¤ variety between domestic and foreign production is reminiscent of a key
contribution to the o¤shoring literature by Feenstra and Hanson (1996). While in their
theoretical model, o¤shoring takes the form of relocating labor-intensive activities of a sin-
gle manufactured good, they adopt a more general denition of o¤shoring in the empirical
part.3 Next to imports of intermediate goods, they further include nal goods that are sold
under the brandname of a rm in their denition of o¤shoring. Therefore, this measure-
ment of o¤shoring is directly related to our way of dening o¤shoring as the relocation of
complete production lines. By including nal goods in their measure of o¤shoring, Feenstra
and Hanson do better at explaining wage patterns and employment changes for the United
States.4 Other empirical papers measure o¤shore activity by the total employment of foreign
a¢ liates. Using this kind of measure, authors typically think of capturing the relocation of
vertically related tasks or the replication of domestic production abroad (horizontal FDI).
However, we show that this way of measuring international activity is perfectly consistent
to what we call multi-product o¤shoring.
Existing theoretical research on MPFs is concerned mainly with the product market side
of the economy. The main question which is tried to be answered is how MPFs absorb inter-
national trade. Intra-rm product switching is frequent and contributes like rm entry and
3Feenstra and Hanson (1996) refer to this phenomenon as outsourcing.
4Feenstra and Hanson (1996) argue that previous studies like Berman et al. (1994) and Lawrence (1994)
did not nd an impact of o¤shoring on U.S. wages because of their narrow denition of o¤shoring.
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exit to the evolution of aggregate outcomes in an industry.5 The literature di¤ers in the way
of modelling the demand for and the decision to supply multiple products and in the assump-
tions about market structure. Most recent models assume that markets can be characterized
by monopolistic competition, in which rms produce a large number of products but are
themselves innitesimal small in scale in the economy (see Arkolakis and Muendler (2010),
Bernard et al. (2011), Nocke and Yeaple (2013), and Mayer et al. (2014)). Our model is
built along the lines of Eckel and Neary (2010) who set up a di¤erent approach and assume
that markets are oligopolistic. Their underlying market structure highlights as an important
feature the cannibalization e¤ect, which also plays a crucial role in our model.6 Next to these
demand linkages, Eckel and Nearys approach incorporates cost linkages between varieties in
the form of exible manufacturing.7
The remainder of the article is structured as follows. Section 2 recaps the basic model
of Eckel and Neary (2010) and incorporates o¤shoring into this framework. Subsequently,
we provide comparative static results of falling o¤shoring costs. Section 3 shows how these
results transform when wages are endogenized in general equilibrium. Section 4 concludes
and summarizes results. Mathematical derivations and a numerical simulation of our model
are presented in the Appendix.
2 The Model
To conduct our analysis, we rely on the multi-product framework with exible manufacturing
proposed by Eckel and Neary (2010). We introduce a model where rms on grounds of
e¢ ciency seeking can relocate the production of labor-intensive goods abroad. Our setup
consists of two countries, Home and Foreign, and a large world market. There is a continuum
of identical industries in Home, whereby the output produced in each of these industries is
sold on the world market. Foreign is a low wage emerging country and acts as a potential
destination for an a¢ liate. We begin this section with the analysis of one single sector by
considering the behavior of the consumers in the world market and the optimal rm behavior
in this industry.
5Bernard et al. (2010) report changing product ranges for more than 50 percent of US rms within ve
years whereby one-half of those rm both added and dropped at least one product.
6The cannibalization e¤ect is also considered in recent articles by Feenstra and Ma (2008) and Dhingra
(2013).
7The concept of exible manufacturing is also used in Milgrom and Roberts (1990), Eaton and Schmitt
(1994), Norman and Thisse (1999), and Eckel (2009).
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2.1 Consumer Behavior: Preferences and Consumer Demand
We assume that LW consumers in the world market maximize their utility dened over the
consumption of di¤erentiated products. Referring to the model of Eckel and Neary (2010),
we maintain the specication of preferences in the form a two-tier utility function.8 The
upper tier is an additive function of a continuum of sub-utility functions over industries z,
where z varies over the interval [0; 1], given by
U [u (z)] =
Z 1
0
u (z) dz. (1)
The representative consumers sub-utility is dened over per variety consumption q(i; z)
with i 2 
 and total consumption Q  R
i2
 q(i; z)di, where 
 is a set of di¤erentiated goods
o¤ered in industry z. To be more specic, we assume
u (z) = aQ  1
2
b

(1  e)
Z
i2

q(i; z)2di+ eQ2

. (2)
Eq. (2) has a standard quadratic form, where a, b denote non-negative preference parameters
and e is an inverse measure of product di¤erentiation which lies between 0 and 1. Lower
values of e imply that products are more di¤erentiated and hence less substitutable. In
the event of e = 1, consumers have no taste for diversity in products and demand depends
on aggregate output only. Consumers maximize utility in Eqs. (1) and (2) subject to the
budget constraint
R 1
0
R
i2
 p(i; z)q(i; z)didz  I, where p (i; z) denotes the price for variety i
in industry z and I is individual income. This yields the following linear inverse individual
demand function:
p(i; z) = a  b [(1  e)q(i; z) + eQ] , (3)
where  is the marginal utility of income, the Lagrange multiplier attached to the budget
constraint. Market-clearing imposes that each rm faces a market demand x(i; z) that con-
sists of the aggregated demand of all consumers in the world market LW q(i; z). For the
inverse world market demand, we get
p(i; z) = a0   b0 [(1  e)x(i; z) + eX] , (4)
where a0  a

is the consumersmaximum willingness to pay and b0  b
LW
is an inverse
measure for the market size. Finally,X  R 
0
x (i; z) di represents the total volume of varieties
produced and consumed in industry z. Note that X is dened over the goods actually
8These preferences combine the continuum quadratic approach to symmetric horizontal product di¤eren-
tiation of Ottaviano et al. (2002) with the preferences in Neary (2009).
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consumed with i 2 [0; ], which is a subset of the potential products 
. With no quasi-linear
term in Eq. (2), the value of  is not constant, which implies that a0 and b0 are endogenously
determined in general equilibrium. However, with a continuum of industries, we may assume
that each rm takes these parameters as given. Hence, each rm has market power in its
own market but it is small in the economy as a whole. This assumption permits a consistent
analysis of oligopoly in general equilibrium. As it has become standard in the literature, we
choose the marginal utility of income as the numeraire and set  equal to one (see Neary
(2009) for further discussion).
2.2 Firm Behavior: Costs and Technology of MPFs
This section considers technology and optimal rm behavior in industry z.9 We focus on
intra-rm adjustments, so competition between rms plays only a second-order role. To keep
the analysis as simple as possible, we focus on the monopoly case. Extending the analysis to
oligopoly is straightforward.10 According to that, each industry z is characterized by exactly
one rm whose objective it is to maximize prots by choosing both the scale and scope
of production, as well as choosing the optimal location for producing each specic variety.
When choosing the optimal location for production, rms seek to reduce costs by producing
labor-intensive goods o¤shore where a comparative advantage exists due to lower wages. For
simplicity, we assume no xed costs for both domestic and foreign production.
In our model, an MPF is characterized by a core competence and exible manufacturing.
Technology is rm-specic and, therefore, it can be applied correspondingly in Home and in
Foreign. As in Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008), technology is transferable as a home
rm will use its own technology when performing a task abroad. Flexible manufacturing
is characterized by one core competence, in which the rm is most e¢ cient in fabrication.
Furthermore, an MPF can produce additional varieties with rising marginal costs.
Production costs in our model comprise both a product-specic and a monitoring compo-
nent (managerial e¤ort) which we assume to be zero for production at home. This assumption
implies that the ability to monitor varies with distance. Managerial e¤ort is needed to su-
pervise production and to provide the rms technology abroad.11 By incorporating these
costs, we try to capture the more general idea that aggravated monitoring through man-
9We concentrate on symmetric industries and drop the industry index z in the following analysis. We
consider this index again when we aggregate over all industries and turn to the level of the economy as a
whole in general equilibrium.
10The interested reader is referred to the Appendix in Eckel et al. (2011).
11See for example Grossman and Helpman (2004). They assume that a principal is able to observe the
managers e¤orts at a lower cost when the managers division is located near to the rms headquarters as
compared with when it is located across national borders.
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agers, less skilled workers, worse infrastructure, or inferior contractual enforcement, a¤ect
production in emerging countries. In the following analysis, we refer to this cost component
as o¤shoring costs. To put it formally, we assume a Ricardian technology where domestic
(foreign) production costs c(i) (c(i)) are given by
c(i) = w(i) and (5)
c(i) = w((i) + t), (6)
with (i) denoting the labor input coe¢ cient for variety i, w (w) being the wage level in
Home (Foreign) and nally t representing the o¤shoring costs.12 Latter is measured in labor
costs and is the same for all products assembled abroad. As we are analyzing the relocation
of total production lines and not the relocation of just parts of a production process, the
assumption that t is identical for all o¤shored varieties seems fair. Technology is rm- and
not country-specic, therefore (i) is the same in both countries. We assume the following
properties:  (0) = 0 and @c
@i
= @
@i
w > 0.
Closed Economy: Without o¤shoring, optimal rm behavior is composed of maximiz-
ing total rm prots both with regard to scale and to scope. Considering the technology
assumptions above and denoting the scope of the product portfolio by , prots are given by
 =
Z 
0
[p(i)  c(i)]x(i)di. (7)
Firms simultaneously choose the quantity produced of each good and the mass of products
produced. Maximizing prots in Eq. (7) with respect to scale x (i) implies the rst-order
condition for scale:
@
@x(i)
= p(i)  c(i)  b0 [(1  e)x(i) + eX] = 0 (8)
that leads to the optimal output of a single variety
x(i) =
a0   w(i)  2b0eX
2b0(1  e) (9)
12Foreign variables are denoted by an asterisk throughout.
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with X  R 
0
x(i)di denoting total rm scale.13 The negative impact of total rm scale X
on the output of a single variety displays the cannibalization e¤ect: @x(i)
@X
=   e
(1 e) < 0.
An MPF internalizes the e¤ect that increasing output of a certain variety lowers prices for
this, as well as, for all other varieties in the rms product range. This e¤ect only exists if
e > 0, i.e. if products are not perfectly di¤erentiated. Furthermore, Eq. (9) shows that,
given its total output, a rm produces less of each variety the further away it is from its
core competence. Given the symmetric structure of demand, this means that a rm charges
higher prices for products that are further away from its core competence (see Eckel and
Neary (2010), p.193 for a detailed analysis).
In the next step, we consider the rms optimal choice of product line. MPFs add new
products as long as marginal prots are positive. Maximizing Eq. (7) with respect to scope
implies the respective rst-order condition14
@
@
= [p()  c()]x() = 0. (10)
From Eq. (8), we know that the prot on the marginal variety [p()   c()] cannot be
zero. The rm adds new varieties up to the point where the marginal cost of producing the
marginal variety equals the marginal revenue at zero output. The prot maximizing product
range implies that the output of the marginal variety x() is zero. Using Eq. (9) and setting
x () equal to zero yields
c() = a0   2b0eX. (11)
Comparing Eqs. (9) and (11), we see that rms add new varieties to their product portfolio
until optimal output of the marginal variety falls to zero. Inspecting Eq. (11) reveals the
cannibalization e¤ect which inuences the scope of production: @
@X
=   b0e
@c()=@
< 0. Figure
1 illustrates the rst-order condition for scope and determines the prot-maximizing product
range.
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
Open Economy: So far, we have implicitly assumed that the o¤shoring costs t were
prohibitively high, so that all production was located in the home country. As globalization
13The second-order condition of this maximization problem is: @
2
@x(i)2
= @p(i)@x(i)   b0 (1  e)  b0e @X@x(i) < 0.
14The second-order condition of this maximization problem is: @
2
@2
= [p ()  c ()]@x()@ < 0, as @c()@ > 0
and, thus, @x()@ =   12b0(1 e) @c()@ < 0.
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leads to improvements in information technology and reductions in communication costs,
we analyze a decrease in the parameter t, which implies that rms can enjoy benets of
lower factor prices and thus gains from relocating labor intensive products to a low-wage
location. In our model, the motive for o¤shoring is e¢ ciency-seeking, which means that the
necessary condition for o¤shoring is: w < w. The su¢ cient condition for o¤shoring is that
the o¤shoring costs are below a critical value: t < tcrit. The critical value of o¤shoring costs
can be calculated as
tcrit =
(a0   2beX)(w   w)
ww
. (12)
It is straightforward to see that the critical value of o¤shoring costs is rising in the wage
di¤erential between Home and Foreign.
In the analysis below, we refer to cases in which o¤shoring cost are su¢ ciently low, so
there is a fragmentation of production into domestic and foreign-produced varieties. We
dene e as the cuto¤ variety. For variety e, the rm is indi¤erent concerning its optimal pro-
duction location. Varieties with a lower labor input coe¢ cient than e are produced onshore,
whereas varieties with a higher labor input coe¢ cient are produced o¤shore. Combining
Eqs. (6) and (9), gives the optimal scale of a foreign-produced variety:
x(i) =
a0   w((i) + t)  2b0eX
2b0(1  e) . (13)
Given that the marginal variety is produced in Foreign, the prot maximizing product range
is dened by
w(() + t) = a0   2b0eX. (14)
In the open economy, an MPF faces a third maximization problem, next to optimal scale and
scope of production. Now, the rm has also to determine the prot maximizing geographic
location of production. Analogous to Eq. (7), total prots in the open economy are given
by
 =
eZ
0
(p(i)  c(i))x(i)di+
Z
e
(p(i)  c(i))x(i)di, (15)
with the rst integral being total prots from domestic production and the second integral
being the equivalent for foreign production. With Eq. (8) and total rm output X being
composed of domestically and foreign-produced goods as
X =
eZ
0
x(i)di+
Z
e
x(i)di, (16)
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we can rearrange Eq. (15):
 = (1  e)b0
264 eZ
0
x(i)2di+
Z
e
x(i)2di
375+ b0eX2. (17)
Maximizing Eq. (17) with respect to the optimal cuto¤ of production e leads to
x(e) = x(e). (18)
Formal details of the derivation can be found in the Appendix.
Lemma 1 An MPF chooses the optimal cuto¤ level of production e exactly at that product
where optimal scale in Home and in Foreign are the same. Combining Eqs. (9) and (13),
this means that for variety e the rm is just indi¤erent concerning the location of production
because costs are identical, i.e.
w(e) = w((e) + t). (19)
To visualize our analysis, we illustrate the e¤ects of falling o¤shoring costs in Figure 2.
In Figure 2a), production of the whole portfolio is accomplished in Home as o¤shoring costs
are prohibitively high. In Figure 2b), o¤shoring cost are below the critical value in Eq. (12).
We observe that varieties i 2 [0;e] are still produced in Home, as their production is e¢ cient
enough, so the benets of lower foreign wages do not prevail the o¤shoring costs. Production
of varieties i 2]e; old[ is relocated, as these goods can be produced at a lower cost in Foreign.
Products i 2]old; [ constitute an extension of the rms product range. The MPF adds
these varieties at the intra-rm extensive margin, whereby these goods would not be o¤ered
in case of producing exclusively in Home. The specication of our model suggests that an
MPF produces exactly those varieties o¤shore, where its e¢ ciency is relatively low.
[Insert Figure 2 about here]
We conclude this section with a graphical illustration of the main properties of our model
in Figure 3. The graph portrays optimal scale of production for the entire portfolio across
the two production locations. We will use this graph in the next section as a useful tool
in the comparative statics analysis. Figure 3 shows that due to the underlying exible
manufacturing technology, output of the core competence is the highest. At the cuto¤ e
10

x
e = x e the rm switches to foreign production. Therefore, the slope of the curve
changes at this point. Finally, the prot maximizing product range is pinned down at
x () = 0.
[Insert Figure 3 about here]
2.3 Comparative Statics
We still assume that t is below its critical value determined in Eq. (12), so the rm engages
in foreign production. In the comparative statics, we analyze the e¤ect of better prospects
for o¤shoring on the geographic organization (optimal cuto¤) and on the prot-maximizing
product range. Furthermore, we investigate the impact of reduced costs of o¤shoring on the
output of domestic and foreign-produced varieties, as well as on total rm output. These
endogenous variables of our model x(i), x(i), , X, and, e are determined in Eqs. (9), (13),
(14), (16), and, (19) respectively. Totally di¤erentiating this system of equations generates
the comparative-static e¤ects of decreasing o¤shoring costs t.
Recent academic research on MPFs brings forth varying results on the e¤ects of global-
ization on the product range of a rm. A set of papers, including Eckel and Neary (2010),
Bernard et al. (2011), and Mayer et al. (2014) show that MPFs will reduce their product
ranges in response to trade liberalization. Increased competition forces rms to drop their
worst performing products. In Feenstra and Ma (2008), increasing the market size leads to
an expansion of the product range. Very recently, Qiu and Zhou (2013) show that the most
productive rms in an economy may expand their product scope after globalization. In this
paper, we do not focus on the competition and market size e¤ects of globalization. Glob-
alization does also mean that access to foreign production locations is facilitated. Having
the latter interpretation in mind, we can clearly show that the product scope increases in
response to globalization.
Proposition 1 If t is below the critical value determined in Eq. (12), falling o¤shoring
costs induce an MPF to add new products at the intra-rm extensive margin, i.e.
d ln 
d ln t
=   2t
10 () 
< 0, (20)
where: 1 = (1  e+ e) > 0 and 2 =

1  e+ e~

:
This result can be visualized in Figure 2b). A decrease in t corresponds to a downward
shift of the c-curve which indicates an extension of the product range.
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In a next step, we want to discuss the e¤ects of globalization on the domestic product
range ~. With respect to the large literature on international production, this aspect has
been neglected so far in theoretical models. We nd that better prospects for o¤shoring
reduce the domestic product range and incentivize a rm to relocate marginal varieties.
Proposition 2 Falling o¤shoring costs make foreign production more attractive and thus
lead to an e¢ ciency-seeking relocation of production from the high-wage country to the low-
wage country, i.e.
d ln ~
d ln t
=
wt
(w   w) 0

~

~
> 0. (21)
As the wage rate in the home country w is higher than abroad w, the expression is
strictly positive. The magnitude of this e¤ect can be shown to depend on the point elasticity
of the cost curve at the marginal variety: (~)  0

~

~=

~

. The latter stands for
an inverse measure of exibility of an MPF. High values of (~) imply that a change in
~ will cause a large change in marginal costs. Hence, the change in the domestic product
range following globalization will be smaller, the stronger domestic production costs react
to a marginal decrease in ~. To see this, we can rewrite Eq. (21) in d ln ~=d ln t = 1=(~)
using the indi¤erence condition in Eq. (19). In Figure 2b), a decrease in t corresponds to
a downward shift of the c (i)-curve which is equivalent to shifting production abroad (e
falls). Former domestically produced goods are now produced abroad. Referring to previous
discussion, the e¤ect is less pronounced in the case of steep cost curves.
So far, we have analyzed within-rm adjustments at the intra-rm extensive margin. In
the next step, we focus on the output proles (intensive margin) of domestically and foreign-
produced varieties. Following a fall in t, o¤shore production gets cheaper and, therefore,
foreign varieties are produced at a larger scale.
Proposition 3 If t is below the critical value determined in Eq. (12), falling o¤shoring
costs induce the rm to increase outputs of all foreign-produced varieties, i.e.
d lnx (i)
d ln t
=   w
t
2b0 (1  e)x (i)
2
1
< 0. (22)
As an important feature in our model, we emphasize demand linkages between varieties
in the product portfolio of a rm. Falling o¤shoring costs do not reduce domestic production
costs but indirectly a¤ect domestic output through the cannibalization e¤ect. Rising output
of foreign production crowds out domestic production as domestic varieties internalize the
cannibalization e¤ect.
12
Proposition 4 The cannibalization e¤ect induces an MPF to reduce outputs of all domes-
tically produced varieties in consequence of falling o¤shoring costs, i.e.
d lnx (i)
d ln t
=
e

   ~

1
wt
2b0 (1  e)x (i) > 0. (23)
In the case of perfectly di¤erentiated varieties, i.e. e = 0, domestic output is independent
of foreign production and hence, the derivative in Eq. (23) is zero. With e being positive,
varieties become substitutable and domestic output is crowded out by foreign production.
However, it is straightforward to show that despite lower domestic output, total rm output
X is increasing with falling o¤shoring cost. The positive impact of rising foreign output
combined with the extension of the product range outweighs the negative impact of falling
domestic output on total rm scale.
Proposition 5 With falling o¤shoring costs, an MPF increases total rm output because of
the higher scale of foreign-produced varieties and the extension of the product portfolio, i.e.
d lnX
d ln t
=  
w

   ~

t
2b01X
< 0. (24)
Formal details of all the derivations can be found in the Appendix. To illustrate the e¤ects
of falling o¤shoring costs, we draw on the graphical tool developed in Figure 3. In Figure 4,
the dotted line represents the situation after the reduction in t. Inspecting this graph reveals
two negative e¤ects on domestic production: A relocation e¤ect from shifting production
abroad and a cannibalization e¤ect from rising foreign output. The latter e¤ect is a new
transmission channel specic to MPFs that we want to highlight. It results from the fact that
with lower production costs abroad, output of foreign varieties and the foreign product range
will increase. These intra-rm adjustments crowd out the production of domestic varieties
which does not benet from lower production costs abroad. The main comparative static
results are indicated by the arrows in Figure 4.
[Insert Figure 4 about here]
2.4 Implications for the Measurement of O¤shoring
From a theoretical point of view, the way we are thinking about o¤shoring as a relocation of
production lines within MPFs is novel. However, the manner how o¤shoring is measured in
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the broad empirical literature on international production is similar to our denition. The
measure of outsourcing which is used in Feenstra and Hanson (1996) is directly related to our
denition, as it includes also nal goods next to imported intermediates. The authors argue
that this "must be included in any valid measure of outsourcing" (Feenstra and Hanson
(1996), p.107). Many other papers that discuss o¤shoring from an empirical perspective
use measurements of o¤shoring that respond not only to a relocation of vertically related
processes, but also respond to what we call multi-product o¤shoring. Papers such as Head
and Ries (2002), Ebenstein et al. (2012), and Becker et al. (2013) measure o¤shoring activity
in an industry by the total employment of foreign a¢ liates. Using employment in foreign
a¢ liates as a measure for o¤shoring is perfectly in-line with our model. To underline that
measuring o¤shoring like this could also mean the type of o¤shoring that we have in mind,
we calculate the total employment in foreign a¢ liates and show how it responds to better
o¤shoring opportunities. In industry z, labor demand l for foreign-produced varieties is
given by
l (z) =
(z)Z
e(z)
(i)x(i)di. (25)
It is determined by the scale and scope of foreign-produced varieties i 2 [e; ]. We derive
total labor demand in the o¤shore destination L by integrating over all industries z 2 (0; 1)
L =
1Z
0
l (z) dz =
1Z
0
(z)Z
e(z)
(i; z)x(i; z)didz. (26)
By substituting for x (i) and evaluating the integral, we come up with the following equation
L =

   ~
 
(a0   2b0eX   wt)0   w00

2b0 (1  e) ; (27)
where 0  1 ~
R 
~
 (i) di is the mean labor input of foreign-produced varieties and 00 
1
 ~
R 
~
 (i)2 di is the second moment around zero of the distribution of labor requirements.
We totally di¤erentiate Eq. (27) and analyze again the e¤ects of better prospects for o¤-
shoring:
d lnL
d ln t
=   w
t
2b0 (1  e)L
8<:

   ~

02
1
+
~w

()  

~

(w   w) (~)
9=; < 0. (28)
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The latter expression clearly indicates that the total employment of foreign a¢ liates is in-
creasing in falling o¤shoring costs. Therefore, measuring o¤shore activity by total employ-
ment of foreign a¢ liates captures the type of o¤shoring that we have in mind.
Lemma 2 Falling o¤shoring costs increase total employment in the o¤shoring destination.
3 General Equilibrium
The previous section analyzed the e¤ects of falling o¤shoring costs on the product range,
per variety output, total rm output and the optimal location of production. Up to this
point, the approach was partial, since we did not consider endogenous changes in wages.
Our analysis in partial equilibrium clearly yields a fall in domestic production, because, on
the one hand, per variety output of domestic varieties gets crowded out and, on the other
hand, varieties close to the cuto¤ are relocated with falling o¤shoring costs. In the next
steps, we focus on new insights into the labor market e¤ects from o¤shoring which arise
from the framework that we have presented so far. For this purpose, we introduce a simple
labor market and show how domestic labor demand is a¤ected by multi-product o¤shoring.
Subsequently, we analyze again the comparative statics exercise of falling o¤shoring costs
under consideration of labor market clearing.
3.1 Labor Market Clearing
In this section, we turn to the level of the economy as a whole and explore the general
equilibrium e¤ects of falling o¤shoring costs. To simplify the analysis, we assume that all
industries are identical. In a rst step, we need to specify how wages are determined. We
assume a total labor supply LS, that is supplied inelastically by the households in Home.
Domestic labor demand in industry z is given by
l (z) =
Z e(z)
0
 (i)x (i) di. (29)
It is determined by the scale and scope of domestically produced varieties i 2 [0;e]. We
derive total labor demand L in our economy by integrating over all industries z 2 (0; 1):
L =
1Z
0
l (z) dz =
1Z
0
e(z)Z
0
(i; z)x(i; z)didz: (30)
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Our main interest in this section is to determine the labor market e¤ects of o¤shoring. In the
previous section we have identied two e¤ects of falling o¤shoring costs: A relocation e¤ect
and a cannibalization e¤ect. The relocation e¤ect a¤ects the marginal variety e and the
cannibalization e¤ect a¤ects the scale of domestic production x (i). Totally di¤erentiating
domestic labor demand in Eq. (30) with respect to t yields:
d lnL
d ln t
=
e
L
8><>:
e xe d lne
d ln t| {z }
relocation e¤ect
+ 0x (i)
d lnx (i)
d ln t| {z }
cannibalization e¤ect
9>=>; > 0, (31)
with 0  1e
R e
0
(i)di being the mean labor input of domestically produced varieties.15 The
rst part of Eq. (31) describes the relocation e¤ect and the second part stands for the canni-
balization e¤ect. Latter e¤ect is new and is specic to MPFs. With falling o¤shoring costs,
scale of foreign production rises because of lower production costs abroad. This behavior
cannibalizes domestic production and reduces domestic labor demand.
Lemma 3 For a given domestic wage, falling o¤shoring costs reduce domestic demand for
labor through two channels. A relocation e¤ect leads to a shift of labor-intensive domestic
products abroad. Furthermore, domestic production internalizes a cannibalization e¤ect of
rising foreign output and is crowded out.
In equilibrium, wages must adjust to ensure that total labor supply LS equals total labor
demand determined by the cuto¤ of domestic production e in all industries z 2 (0; 1). This
is reected by the following labor-market equilibrium condition for the home country:
LS =
1Z
0
l (z) dz =
1Z
0
e(z)Z
0
(i; z)x(i; z)didz. (32)
We can now substitute for x(i) and evaluate the integral to obtain
LS =
e (a0   2b0eX)0   w00
2b0(1  e) , (33)
where 00  1e
R e
0
(i)2di stands for the second moment around zero of the distribution of
labor requirements. Combining Eq. (33) with the system of equations from the analysis
in partial equilibrium, we can use the respective equations for investigating how rm-level
15From inspection of propositions 2 and 4, we know that: d ln
e
d ln t > 0 and
d ln x(i)
d ln t > 0.
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adjustments respond to declining o¤shoring costs with endogenous wages. We derive the
comparative statics results by totally di¤erentiating all equations of the system. Formal
details of all the derivations can be found in the Appendix.
3.2 Comparative Statics in General Equilibrium
One important issue in general equilibrium which we want to analyze in the rst place, is
the e¤ect of better prospects for o¤shoring on domestic factor prices w. In the previous
sections, we have identied two negative impacts of o¤shoring on domestic labor demand:
The relocation and the cannibalization e¤ect. However, in equilibrium, total labor supply
must equal total demand for labor. To ensure this equality, domestic wages must fall.
Proposition 6 With falling o¤shoring costs, ceteris paribus, foreign production gets more
attractive. To ensure labor market clearing in equilibrium, there are adjustments on the labor
market in the form of falling domestic wages, i.e.16
w
wt
d lnw
d ln t
=
n
e (w   w) 0

~

   ~

~0 +1w

h
()  

~
i


~
o
> 0. (34)
Considering these labor market adjustments reveals that in general equilibrium falling
o¤shoring costs not only make foreign production cheaper but also reduce production costs
in the home country. The latter has important implications on the main variables of interest
in our model, which we point out in the following.
With lower production costs in both countries, it is apparent that an MPF will increase
its total scale:
d lnX
d ln t
=  
w

   ~

t
2b01X
  w
~0
2b01X
d lnw
d ln t
< 0. (35)
The mathematical derivation and an expression where the change in wages is substituted
can be found in the Appendix. Eq. (35) is the general equilibrium equivalent of Eq. (24).
Comparing both equations immediately points out that due to the adjustment of factor
prices (represented by the second fraction), the general equilibrium e¤ect will be of greater
magnitude than the partial equilibrium e¤ect (represented by the rst fraction). Within
our framework, a larger rm scale X enhances cannibalization between varieties. Caused
by falling domestic wages, the latter e¤ect leads to a new channel that we have to consider
when analyzing the repercussions of falling o¤shoring costs on the product range of a rm.
16The term  =
nh
(1  e) + e

   ~
i
~00 + e~
2
2
o
(w   w) 0

~

+1

~

w
h
()  

~
i


~

is the determinant of the system of equations. It is positive which ensures that the equilibrium is unique
and stable.
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We illustrate this channel in the following equation:
d ln 
d ln t
=   2t
10 () 
+
ew~0
1w0 () 
d lnw
d ln t
< 0, (36)
where the rst part of Eq. (36) represents the partial e¤ect which is clearly of a negative
sign. The second part of Eq. (36) is the additional channel in general equilibrium arising
from the adjustment of wages. This e¤ect is positive and, therefore, works in the opposite
direction as it induces the rm to increase its total output X. Inspecting Eq. (36) reveals
that the general equilibrium e¤ect is switched o¤ for e being zero. With products being
perfectly di¤erentiated, there is no cannibalization of the rising total rm output X on the
marginal varieties within the product range. However, we can analytically show that the
result from partial equilibrium is reconrmed even for e > 0. Therefore, the adjustments in
general equilibrium only have a dampening e¤ect on the product range which is driven by
the intensity of cannibalization determined by the di¤erentiation parameter e. A proof for
this result is provided in the Appendix.
Proposition 7 Falling o¤shoring costs reduce costs in both production sites and hence en-
large total rm output X to a larger extend compared to partial equilibrium. Latter result
dampens but does not reverse the e¤ect of falling o¤shoring costs on the product range in
general equilibrium. The dampening e¤ect depends on the strength of cannibalization.
In the next step, we focus our attention on the optimal geographic organization of an
MPF. Regarding the optimal cuto¤ of production, we identify two opposing forces in general
equilibrium following a fall in the parameter t. On the one hand, there is the direct e¤ect
of lower o¤shoring costs which tends to shift production abroad (observed e¤ect in partial
equilibrium, see Eq. (21)). On the other hand, we nd decreasing domestic wages which
brings forth an inventive to pull back production into the home country. The latter causes
an ambiguity on the total e¤ect of falling o¤shoring costs in general equilibrium which can
be seen in the following derivative:

wt
d ln ~
d ln t
= 1
00
   e
h
   ~



~

+ ~0
i
0 ? 0. (37)
We now focus on this ambiguity and investigate the causes that lie behind it. To begin
with, Eq. (37) is positive for e being zero. With perfectly di¤erentiated products, domestic
varieties do not internalize cannibalization through rising outputs of foreign varieties (com-
pare Eq. (23)). Thus, there is no reducing force on domestic labor demand via a lower
scale of domestically produced varieties (the cannibalization e¤ect of o¤shoring, stressed in
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Eq. (31)). Thereby, to ensure labor market clearing, domestic wages will decline less and
the wage-e¤ect will not dominate the better opportunities to o¤shore. With 0 < e < 1,
there is the possibility that Eq. (37) gets negative, i.e. with falling o¤shoring costs even
more products are produced in Home. This happens if the general equilibrium adjustment
of factor prices prevails the foreign cost reduction via lower o¤shoring costs.
To get some further intuition for this ambiguity, we investigate the e¤ect of an exogenous
change in domestic wages on domestic output. Di¤erentiating optimal scale x (i) in Eq. (9)
with respect to the wage rate w yields:17
d lnx (i)
d lnw
=
w
2b0 (1  e)x (i)
h
ee0  1(i)i
1
7 0. (38)
The algebraic sign of Eq. (38) behaves ambiguously. Outputs of varieties with a labor
input coe¢ cient (i) far below the average 0 may even fall with falling wages (i.e. for
these varieties d lnx(i)
d lnw
> 0). The reason for this is that varieties which are very e¢ cient in
production require just sparse labor input and hence, benet slightly from falling wages.
However, these varieties fully internalize the cannibalization e¤ect through rising outputs of
labor-intensive varieties which benet a lot from lower factor prices.18 Latter results imply
that varieties benet more from falling wages the higher is their respective labor input. These
insights are important features of our model which can help to explain the ambiguous e¤ects
of lower o¤shoring costs on the cuto¤ variety e.
From the total derivatives of our system of equations, we obtain two equations in d lne
d ln t
and d lnw
d ln t
, given by19
d ln ~
d ln t
=
wt
(w   w) 0

~

~
 
w

~

(w   w) 0

~

~
d lnw
d ln t
? 0 (39)
and
d ln ~
d ln t
=  
wt

   ~

e0
13

~
 + w
3

~
  00   e~021
!
d lnw
d ln t
? 0. (40)
17The interested reader nds the e¤ects of an exogenous change in domestic wages on all endogenous
variables in the Appendix.
18The condition for the output of the core competence to fall with falling wages is : (0) <
ee0
1
. The
cuto¤ variety e has the highest labor input coe¢ cient (e) in the domestic product range. The output of
this variety x(e) rises with falling wages: d ln x(e)d lnw < 0.
193 =

(a0   2b0eX)  w(~)

> 0. From the rst-order condition of scope it becomes obvious that this
expression is positive.
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Eq. (39) follows immediately from the determination of the prot maximizing cuto¤ in Eq.
(19). Eq. (40) is derived after some mathematical conversion from the labor market clearing
condition in Eq. (33). Inspecting Eq. (39) reveals that the partial equilibrium result (the
rst part of the expression) is more likely to be reversed, the higher the adjustment in wages
is weighted. From the analysis of Eq. (38), we know that varieties with high labor inputs
will benet more from reductions in factor prices. This insight can be reapplied to Eq. (39),
where we observe the wage e¤ect to be of greater impact, the higher is the labor input at the
marginal variety 

~

. By analogy, we apply this intuition to Eq. (40), where it becomes
apparent that the higher is the mean labor input of domestic production 0, the more likely
the domestic wage reduction outweighs the cost advantage through lower o¤shoring costs.
We summarize these insights in the following proposition.
Proposition 8 In partial equilibrium, lower o¤shoring costs t lead to a distinct fall in e (i.e.
d lne
d ln t
> 0). This result does not necessarily hold in general equilibrium which implies that it is
possible that even more products are produced onshore with better opportunities of o¤shoring
(i.e. d lne
d ln t
< 0). This ambiguity is caused by the general equilibrium result of falling domestic
wages. We show that the result in partial equilibrium is more likely to be reversed, the higher
are the benets of falling wages in the domestic production.
We conclude this section by illustrating the ambiguity on e in a nd lne
d ln t
, d lnw
d ln t
o
space.
Figure 5 illustrates Eqs. (39) and (40). For Eq. (39), the slope is clearly negative, whereas
the slope of Eq. (40) depends on the sign of

00  
ee(0)2
1

.
[Insert Figure 5 about here]
We take away from the graph that the more do domestic wages respond to changes in
the o¤shoring costs, the more likely is a result contrary to the partial equilibrium case (an
intersection of the two curves below the x-axis). By all means d lne
d ln t
< 0, for 00 
ee(0)2
1
,
which implies Eq. (40) to be horizontal or to be negatively sloped. If 00 >
ee(0)2
1
, Figure 5
illustrates that the algebraic sign of d lne
d ln t
can be both negative or positive.
In the Appendix, we provide a numerical simulation of our model where we show that
in fact, the result in partial equilibrium can be reversed in general equilibrium. Assuming
specic parameter values and a linear cost function, we are able to document that there are
cases in which d lne
d ln t
< 0.
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4 Conclusion
Although globalization of production has been discussed extensively in the literature, there
is not yet a framework to study the relocation of whole varieties within the boundaries of
a rm. In this chapter, we show that the relocation of entire production lines leads to
new insights into the labor market outcomes of o¤shoring. Reversing the assumptions that
processes within a rm are vertically related and that part of the production of a variety stays
in the home country we have highlighted new multi-product specic transmission channels
of o¤shoring. We set up a general oligopolistic equilibrium model of MPFs and o¤shoring,
which allows us to study the consequences of globalization in the sense of declining costs of
o¤shoring. We show that better prospects for o¤shoring a¤ect the geographic organization
and the product range of an MPF. Giving a rm the opportunity to o¤shore the production
of labor-intensive products will lead to a broader product range. Considering the o¤shoring
impacts on domestic employment, we highlight the cannibalization e¤ect of foreign on do-
mestic output, which hits domestic employment next to the well established relocation e¤ect.
Having wages endogenized, our model suggests ambiguous tendencies on the cuto¤ of pro-
duction. The more do domestic wages respond to changes in o¤shoring costs and the higher
are the benets from lower wages in domestic production, the more likely is an even extended
domestic production in an economy with increasing globalization. Therefore, our model is
able to predict patterns in which rms re-relocate entire product lines following globalization
and a decline in o¤shoring costs.
One issue we did not consider in our model is welfare of workers. As our specication
considers domestic production only and consumption takes place on a third market, workers
su¤er from declining wages and do not benet from lower prices of nal goods. Due to this
construction it does not make sense to assess welfare as we can not make any statements
concerning the real wages in our model.
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5 Appendix
5.1 Proof of Lemma 1
In the open economy scenario, an MPF has to determine the prot maximizing geographic
location of production. In the following, we will sketch this maximization problem. From
the rst-order condition for scale in Eq. (8), we know:
p(i)  c(i) = b0(1  e)x(i) + b0eX, (A1)
which inserted in the open economy total prots in Eq. (15) leads to

b0
= (1  e)
eZ
0
x(i)2di+ eX
eZ
0
x(i)di+ (1  e)
Z
e
x(i)2di+ eX
Z
e
x(i)di. (A2)
Given that X =
eR
0
x(i)di +
R
e x
(i)di, we derive Eq. (17). To identify a condition for an
optimally chosen cuto¤ variety e, we maximize Eq. (17) with respect to e. This implies the
following rst-order condition:
1
b0
d
de = (1  e)
264 eZ
0
2x(i)
dx(i)
de di+
Z
e
2x(i)
dx
de di
375 (A3)
+(1  e)
h
x(e)2   x(e)2i+ (1  e)x()d
de + 2eX dXde = 0.
With x() = 0, dx(i)
de = dx(i)de =   e1 e dXde , and some mathematical conversion, we derive
1
b0
d
de = (1  e)
h
x(e)2   x(e)2i = 0. (A4)
5.2 Comparative Statics in Partial Equilibrium
In the following, we show how to derive the comparative static results of the model. In our
model, the equilibrium is determined by the following system of equations:
w(e) = w((e) + t) (A5)
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x(i) =
a0   w(i)  2b0eX
2b0(1  e) (A6)
x(i) =
a0   w((i) + t)  2b0eX
2b0(1  e) (A7)
X =
eZ
0
x(i)di+
Z
e
x(i)di (A8)
w(() + t) = a0   2b0eX (A9)
We can reduce this system of equations to two equations in e and . In a rst step, we
substitute Eqs.(A6) and (A7) in Eq.(A8) and derive total output as
X =
1
2b01
8><>:a0   w
eZ
0
 (i) di  w
264 Z
e
 (i) di+ t

   e
375
9>=>; . (A10)
In a second step, we combine the latter expression with Eq. (A9) which leads to
w(() + t) = a0   e
1
8><>:a0   w
eZ
0
 (i) di  w
264 Z
e
 (i) di+ t

   e
375
9>=>; . (A11)
Eqs. (A5) and (A11) constitute two equations in two endogenous variables: e and . By
totally di¤erentiating this system of equations, we derive our results in partial equilibrium.
We show the total derivatives of Eqs. (A5) and (A11) in the next section of this Appendix.
5.3 Comparative Statics in General Equilibrium
In general equilibrium, we add the labor market clearing condition to our system of equations
from the previous section. By substituting Eq. (A9) into the labor market clearing condition
in Eq. (33), we derive
L =
(w(() + t))e0   we00
2b0(1  e) . (A12)
The combination of Eqs. (A5), (A11), and (A12) determines the general equilibrium of
our model. In the total derivatives, we take into account that domestic wages are endoge-
nously determined in the domestic labor market. For deriving the following results, note
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that d
de (e0) =  e and dde (e00) =  e2. Totally di¤erentiating the three equilibrium
conditions Eqs. (A5), (A11), and (A12), with the results written as a matrix equation, we
can analyze a change in the o¤shoring cost t as follows:2664
0 (w   w) 0

~



~

1 0  e~0
~0 w

h
()  

~
i


~

 ~00
3775
0B@
0()d ln 
td ln t
~d ln ~
wtd ln t
wd lnw
wtd ln t
1CA =
0B@ 1 2
 ~0
1CA . (A13)
The terms 1 and 2 are dened in Eq. (20) and are strictly positive. Using 2 = 
00
   02 ,
we can show that the determinant of the coe¢ cient matrix  is positive:
 =
nh
(1  e) + e

   ~
i
~00 + e~
2
2
o
(w   w) 0

~

+1

~
2
w
h
()  

~
i
> 0.
(A14)
In the following, we provide the solutions of the comparative statics exercise which we use
in the general equilibrium part of our model.
E¤ect on Domestic Wages:
wd lnw
wtd ln t
=
1


0 (w   w) 0

~

1
1 0  2
~0 w

h
()  

~
i


~

 ~0
 (A15)
wd lnw
wtd ln t
=
1

n
(w   w) 0

~

e

   ~

~0 +1w

h
()  

~
i


~
o
> 0 (A16)
E¤ect on Product Range:
0 () d ln 
td ln t
=
1


1 (w   w) 0

~



~

 2 0  e~0
 ~0 w
h
()  

~
i


~

 ~00
 (A17)
0 () d ln 
td ln t
=   1

0@ nh(1  e) + e   ~i ~00 + e~22o (w   w) 0 ~
+

1

~

  e~0

w
h
()  

~
i


~
 1A < 0 (A18)
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E¤ect on Total Output: Totally di¤erentiating Eq. (A10) and using information from
Eq. (A16) yields
2b01X
wt
d lnX
d ln t
=  

   ~

 
~0

n
(w   w) 0

~

e

   ~

~0 +1w

h
()  

~
i


~
o
< 0.
(A19)
E¤ect on Cuto¤Variety:
~d ln ~
wtd ln t
=
1


0 1 

~

1  2  e~0
~0  ~0  ~00
 (A20)
Using again 2 = 
00
   02 , we derive the following result:
d ln ~
wtd ln t
=
1


1
00
   e
h
   ~



~

+ ~0
i
0

? 0. (A21)
5.4 E¤ects of an Exogenous Change in Domestic Wages
This section keeps o¤shoring costs t constant and considers responses of the system of en-
dogenously determined variables in Eqs. (9), (13), (14), (16), and (19) to changes in the
domestic wage rate. Totally di¤erentiating this system of equations generates the following
comparative statics results. It is apparent that with falling domestic wages total rm output
will increase, i.e.
d lnX
d lnw
=   w
e0
2b01X
< 0. (A22)
This e¤ect gets larger the more domestic varieties benet from falling wages, i.e. the higher
is 0, and the more domestic varieties are produced onshore, i.e. the higher is e.
Changes in domestic factor prices clearly a¤ect the cuto¤ variety e as it is determined by
the equality of production costs on- and o¤shore. With Home becoming a more attractive
production site, more varieties will be manufactured domestically, i.e.
d lne
d lnw
=   w
(w   w)
(e)
0
ee < 0. (A23)
Akin to the previous result, we nd that this e¤ect gets stronger the more the cuto¤ variety
benets from falling wages in terms of a higher marginal labor requirement (e). With
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varieties not being perfectly di¤erentiated (i.e. e > 0), foreign scale gets crowded out
d lnx (i)
d lnw
=
w
2b0 (1  e)x (i)
ee0
1
> 0, (A24)
and the product range decreases as marginal varieties undergo cannibalization
d ln 
d lnw
=
eew0
1w0()
> 0. (A25)
The cannibalization e¤ect becomes stronger the more domestic production benets from
falling wages (i.e. the higher e and 0). Figure 6 illustrates all e¤ects.
5.5 Numerical Example with a Linear Cost Function
In this section, we round down our analysis in general equilibrium with a numerical sim-
ulation, where we focus on the ambiguity of the e¤ect of falling o¤shoring costs t on the
cuto¤ variety ~. For specic parameter values and a linear cost function, Table 1 summa-
rizes results for di¤erent degrees of product di¤erentiation. Results once again underline
the issue of cannibalization in this framework. We observe a falling total rm output X
and a falling product range  with rising substitutability between varieties (higher values of
e). Referring to proposition 8 in the main body, it is important to mention that Table 1
shows a specic case where partial equilibrium results with respect to the cuto¤ variety e
get reversed in general equilibrium, i.e. de
dt
< 0. In this parameterization with an underlying
linear cost function, we nd more varieties being produced onshore with falling o¤shoring
costs. As explained before, this result is due to the prevailing e¤ect of falling domestic wages
in comparison to the better prospects for o¤shoring.
Table 1: Numerical Example with a Linear Cost Function
Product di¤erentiation e w X e  de
dt
d
dt
0:1 8:70 121:73 1:36 22:13  0:688  0:495
0:5 8:14 36:13 1:77 8:86  1:081  0:003
0:9 9:01 22:96 1:14 2:91  0:370  0:143
Notes: Parameter values are: a0 = 100, b0 = 2, LW = 20, w = 3:5, and t = 2:5.
For this calculation, we assume a linear cost function:  (i) = 0 + 1i = 1 + 0:5i.
Lemma 4 By assuming a linear cost function within this framework, we can show that there
is the possibility that an MPF produces even more varieties domestically when it faces better
prospects for o¤shoring.
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